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INTERNATIONALIZING NATIONAL POLITICS: LESSONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
GREGORY H. Fox*
The 1990s saw a wide-ranging debate on the role of international actors and
international law in the reform of national political institutions. The wave of
democratic transitions following the end of the Cold War had, for the first
time, framed democratization as an international legal question. Abandoning
the ideological gridlock over questions of governmental legitimacy, which had
been an inevitable result of the East-West conflict, international actors began
to embrace liberal democratic institutions in a variety of settings. From
monitoring national elections to condemning military coups to inserting
democratic principles in criteria for recognizing new states and governments,
the international community appeared to view democracy as increasingly
central to a variety of traditional legal concerns. These actions, of course, were
not uncontroversial. While human rights regimes had long discredited the idea
that the international community should never be involved in matters of
national politics, the move toward democratic legitimacy took intervention a
giant step further. The selection of national leaders is an act at the heart of
most conceptions of state autonomy and sovereignty, but norms of
democratic legitimacy effectively asserted this was no longer a process for a
state to manage alone. To some, particularly in the developing world, this
smacked of a new neo-colonialism. Fuzziness over the definition of
"democracy" raised suspicions that this was simply a Western-led effort to
install their preferred leaders. To others, a decidedly Western understanding
of "democracy" ran through these efforts. In a highly pluralistic world, could
international law define, let alone implement, a uniform model of national
governance?
In my view, the issue explored in this Symposium would not have been
taken up by international lawyers had this debate over national
democratization not taken place. International organizations, in contrast to
states, have no tradition of popular representation. They always have been the
quintessential manifestations of a state-centric legal order that excluded
individuals. International organizations were a highly unlikely place for a
discussion to begin about global democratic norms. States, by contrast, have
been the laboratories for all theories of political accountability, including
democratic theory. If efforts to create democratic norms for states had failed,
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there would be little hope they would nonetheless succeed for international
institutions.
This article starts from the premise that international law has accepted, or is
in the process of accepting, principles of democratic governance for states. It
will ask what lessons this first generation of democratic norms might hold for
future efforts to democratize international organizations. The two settings
arguably have more differences than similarities, and direct parallels between
the two scenarios will be few. Indeed, much of the discussion that follows will
involve pointing out the perhaps insurmountable challenges highlighted by
those differences. But the two undoubtedly share a common understanding of
the sources of political power and the theoretical arguments for its legitimate
exercise. They also seem to share a pragmatic belief that democratic
institutions produce better political decisions. Finally, they may share a belief
in what might be termed "political participation as the sublimation of
violence": the idea that popular engagement in the political process can
redirect hostilities that might otherwise produce political gridlock or even
armed conflict. If one accepts these commonalities, one can be more hopeful
that a "second generation" of democratic rights may emerge for international
organizations.
I. DEBATE OVER INTERNATIONALIZING THE NATIONAL
A. Democraizaion as an International Legal Issue
With the end of the Cold War, the international community began turning
its attention to matters of national governance. Political theorists had long
drawn links between states' domestic politics and their international relations,
the most notable being the Kantian theory of the "democratic peace."1 The
"liberal" school of international relations theory moved beyond examining
democracy's relation to armed conflict and asked whether a host of other state
actions could be correlated with regime type.2 A variety of arguments thus
emerged for viewing democracy as central to states' external behavior.
International law could, therefore, find an interest in democracy promotion,
not only because it would benefit citizens of target states, but because it could
enhance its own regulation of inter-state behavior.
But until the 1990s, international law lacked both the doctrinal tools and
necessary consensus to act on this hypothesis. Until 1945, few norms
1. The EU has adopted this view as justification for its own democracy promotion
activities. See Communication From the Commission on EU Ekctton Assistance and Observation, at 3,
COM (2000) 191 final (Nov. 4 2000) ("Actions in support of democratisation and respect for
human rights, including the right to participate in the establishment of governments through
free and fair elections, can make a major contribution to peace, security and the prevention of
conflicts.").
2. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Serious_: A Liberal Tbeog. of International
Poitics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 513 (1997).
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addressed how governments treated their own citizens, and even after the
United Nations ushered in a steadily growing concern for human rights, slowly
eroding the rigidly territoriality of earlier eras, East-West tensions kept most
issues of national governance off the agenda of international organizations.
This was true despite the presence of a right to political participation in most
comprehensive human rights treaties. 3 Everything changed with the end of
the Cold War. Whatever one is to make of the developments in the 1990s, it
is now clear that international law and international organizations are no
longer indifferent to the internal character of regimes exercising effective
control within sovereign states. In region after region, political change has
swept through the former bastions of authoritarian and dictatorial rule,
offering the promise, if not always the reality, of democratization. 4 This
development has been reflected in international institutions. "The status and
determinacy of the right to political participation have been enhanced by
pronouncements of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee,5 the UN Human
Rights Commission,6 the European [Court of Human Rights,7 the] Inter-
American Commissions on Human Rights, ... the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),9 and the UN General Assembly."10
3. See Protocol No. 3 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 21, 1970, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 45 replaced by Europ.
T.S. No. 155 (Nov. 1, 1998) (Protocol No. 11); Organization of American States, American
Convention on Human Rights art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
4. Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Democray and International Law, 27 REV. INT'L
STUD. 327,327-29 (2001).
5. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25 (57): General Comments under Article
45, Paragraph 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Poh'hcal Rights, 1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996) (elaborating nature of right to political participation in
ICCPR, article 25); Human Rights Committee, Chiiko Bwaya v. Zambia, Communication No.
314/1988, UN Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 (1993), reprinted in 14 HuM. RTs. L.J. 408
(1993) (opining against barring of electoral candidates who are not members of the ruling party).
6. Promotion of the Right to Democracy, Commission on Human Rights Resolution
1999/57 (Apr. 27 1999).
7. See, e.g., Refah v. Turkey, 35 E.H.R.R. 3 (2001); United Communist Party of Turkey
v. Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1998).
8. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11,
2001, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1838 (XXXI-O/01), availabk at http://www.oas.org/
OASpage/eng/Documents/DemocraticCharter.htm; Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, The
Third Summit of the Americas and the Thirty-First Session of the 0AS GeneralAssemby, 96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 173 (2002).
9. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Document of the Moscow
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, Emphasi~ng Respect for Human Rights, Pluraistic
Democrafy, the Rule of Law, and Procedures for Factfnding paras. 17.1-17.2, Oct. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
1670, 1677 (condemning forces seeking to overthrow a freely and fairly elected government and
pledging to "support vigorously, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations," the
"legitimate organs" of that State).
10. Fox & Roth, supra note 4, at 328-29 & nn.7-11 (footnotes 6, 7 & 10 and
explanatory parentheticals therein in original). See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/162, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/162 (Feb. 28 2006) (on "[s]trengthening the role of the United Nations in
enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections and the
promotion of democratization").
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The UN and other intergovernmental organizations have invested heavily in
the crafting and monitoring of electoral processes in many nations across the
globe." On two occasions, the international community has responded
vigorously to military coups against elected governments, endorsing the use of
external armed force to restore the deposed governments of Jean-Bertrand
Aristide in Haiti in 1994 and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone in 1998.12
What began as an adjunct to conflict resolution has grown to a broader,
institutionalized legitimating function. Many international organizations now
maintain permanent electoral-assistance divisions. The United Nations
received 363 requests for electoral assistance between 1989 and 2005, and
provided assistance in 96 countries. 13 Between 1990 and 1995 the European
Union (EU) provided electoral assistance to forty-four different countries.' 4
Similar statistics could be quoted for the OAS and the Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE. Many of these missions end
with the organization determining whether the elections have been conducted
according to criteria of fairness that have essentially achieved boilerplate
status. 15 Necessarily, a determination as to whether an election was conducted
properly speaks to the legitimacy of the purported victor's mandate to govern.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights articulates this basic precept of
democratic theory when it states, "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of
the authority of government."'16
11. See ERic C. BJORNLUND, BEYOND FREE AND FAIR: MONITORING ELECTIONS AND
BUILDING DEMOCRACY 53-66 (2004).
12. See S.C. Res. 1162, para. 2, UN Doc. S/RES/1162 (Apr. 17, 1998) (commending
ECOWAS after the fact for its role in the Sierra Leonean transition); S.C. Res. 940, para. 4, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31,1994) (authorizing armed intervention in Haiti); President of the
Security Council, Statement by the President of the Securi_ Council on the Situation in Sierra Leone,
deh'vered to the Secuwiy Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/1998/5 (Feb. 26, 1998) (Security Council
Presidential Statement welcoming the removal of the Sierra Leonean junta); see also Fox & Roth,
supra note 4, at 329 & n.14.
13. Electoral Assistance Division of the United Nations, Department of Political
Affairs, Overview Information, http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/ead/overview.html.
14. Commission Report on the Implementation of Measures Intended to Promote Observance of
Human Rights and Democratic Principles (for 1995), at 6, COM (1996) 673 final (Jan. 17, 1997),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/externalrelations/human_rights/doc/com96_673
_en.pdf.
15. These standards have been codified. National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs: Access Democracy, Declaration ofPrincipksforInternationalEkction Observation
and the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers, Oct. 27, 2005, available at
http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1923_declaration_102705.pdf. This document
codifies almost two decades of practice and has been endorsed by all major international
organizations engaged in electoral observation. See Press Release, Department of Public
Information, U.N. Doc. HQ/645, United Nations Joins Regional, Non-Governmental
Organizations to Support Code of Common Standards for Election Monitoring, (Oct. 28,
2005), available at http://www.un.Org/Depts/dpa/press-release-election.html.
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. Res/217A, at
75, Art. 21(3) (Dec. 8,1948).
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For purposes of this discussion, the ascendancy of democratization to the
international legal agenda has two useful aspects. The first is that even having
a discussion in legal terms about democratizing international organizations
should not itself be a controversial question. International law now
undoubtedly addresses the democratic origins of political authority.
Notwithstanding the obvious and important differences between the authority
exercised by national governments and that wielded by international
organizations, one cannot now say that seeking a legal analysis of the latter is a
"category mistake"-a manifest transgression of methodological boundaries
that invalidates the substantive conclusions to follow. If individuals are
affected by exercises of political authority, there exists a legal argument for the
democratic legitimization of that authority. Thus, in a case concerning
Gibraltar, the European Court of Human Rights held that the provisions of
the European Convention on Human Rights on elections apply to the
European Parliament, since "legislation emanating from the legislative process
of the European Community affects the population of Gibraltar in the same
way as legislation which enters the domestic legal order .... -17
The second is a methodological point, though no less important: there now
exists a large body of state practice that may provide parallel, if not direct
lessons for democratization of international organizations. Enhancing the
diffusion of norms implicit in this practice are detailed reports and data about
transnational democratization initiatives now available from bodies such as the
Electoral Assistance Division of the United Nations Department of Political
Affairs,18 the European Commission, 19 the Department for the Promotion of
Democracy of the Organization of American States' Secretariat for Political
Affairs,20 the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2' of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 22 the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,23 and the oddly parallel but
separate National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 24 and
International Republican Institute.25 What were once hypotheses about
17. Matthews v. United Kingdom, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 361, 375 (1999).
18. See Electoral Assistance Division of the United Nations, supra note 13.
19. See Commission Staff Working Paper, Impkmentaion of the Communication on Election
Assistance and Observation, at 9, SEC (2003) 1472 (Dec. 19, 2003), availabk at http://ec.europa.eu
/comm/extemal relations/humanrights/doc/sec 2003_1472_en.pdf.
20. Organization of American States, The Democratic Commitment,
http://www.oas.org/keyissues/eng/Keyissue.Detail.asp?Kissec=l (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
21. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, About,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
22. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, http://www.osce.org/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2007).
23. IDEA: International Institute for Democracy & Electoral Assistance,
http://www.idea.int/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
24. NDI: National Democratic Institute, http://www.ndi.org (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
25. IRI: International Republican Institute, http://www.iri.org/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
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whether international actors can affect the quality of national democratic
institutions can now be tested by reference to this practice. Beyond legal
analyses, political scientists have developed a sophisticated understanding of
the factors likely to produce a democratic transition as well as those likely to
bolster or undermine a transition once it occurs.26 Presumably, any claimed
lessons for the democratization of international organizations would share this
empirical grounding.
B. The Scope of the National Democratizaion Debate
The wealth of data now available to international lawyers studying
democratization norms might suggest that analysis of the issue has proceeded
in a rather traditional manner. Some of the literature has indeed consisted of
familiar explications of doctrine. But elevating notions of democratic
legitimacy into law implicates more than the standard questions of uniformity
in practice or clarity of opiniojuris. Systemic consequences may follow from
the new norms subverting international law's traditional neutrality on the
ideological underpinnings of national regimes. Because states, as fictional
entities, operate only through their governments, legal criteria of regime
legitimacy necessarily implicate the legal standing of the state itself. There is
no meaningful way to separate a legally illegitimate regime from a legally
illegitimate state. On this view, the traditional willingness to accord full rights
to any regime in effective control of a state was a necessary corollary to the
principle of state equality. Democracy norms reject the former and may
effectively undermine the latter. This perhaps unexpected aspect of
democratic norms has led both critics and proponents of the emerging regime
to raise a series of questions about its impact on cognate areas of international
law. Not all the following questions have consequences for democratizing
international organizations, but many do.
* Does international democracy promotion implicate some core aspect of
statehood that is or should be immune from international regulation? If
the essence of statehood is autonomous decision-making and the
selection of leaders lies at the heart of how national decisions are made,
what do democratic norms leave of the "sovereign" state? To be sure,
democracy norms do not dictate the outcome of any given question of
national politics. They cannot be said to "control" national politics in
this sense. But who makes national decisions may be as important to an
26. See general# THOMAS CAROTHERS, CRITICAL MISSION: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY
PROMOTION (2004); RENSKE DOORENSPLEET, DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: EXPLORING THE
STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF THE FOURTH WAVE (2005); Adam Przeworski, et al., What Makes
Democrades Endure?,J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1996, at 39 (1996); Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Michael
D. Ward, Diffusion and the Intenatonal Context of Democratization, 60 INT'L ORG. 911 (2006).
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autonomous community as how those decisions are made. Few
collective national identities, after all, revolve around particular policy
outcomes. They are based instead on shared histories, identities,
ethnicities and beliefs. These traditions, in turn, inform the selection of
national leaders and the criteria of legitimacy shared among citizens.
What remains of these community attributes when external standards
dictate the locus of authority within a state?
Democracy is necessarily a theory of community governance. "One
participates in politics not solely (and usually not principally) for the
fulfillment derived from the activity, but for the opportunity to affect the
exercise of power in the polity. '27 But when we talk about a "right" to
democratic government, which community does international law
bestow the right upon? States? Provinces? Regions? Ethnic, religious
or other sub-state affinity groups? Apart from questions of territorial
integrity, does a "democratic" norm hold the potential to bypass a state's
internal structures when it interferes with the "democratic" decisions of
sub-state units? If a province votes by overwhelming majority to ignore
a national government's dictates on language, religion, division of natural
resources or other questions, does a principle of democratic legitimacy
require that such a vote be respected? What if that local vote runs
counter to a national vote supporting the government's policy?
Traditional international law had no interest in these questions of
national constitutional architecture. But once notions of popular
sovereignty are internationalized, can international law take a principled
position on which of these decisions is democratically legitimate and
which is not?
" Is democracy a universal value? The debate over cultural relativism is by
now a well-rehearsed theme in international law. Concerning human
rights generally, most scholars and certainly most international
organizations reject the idea that core rights are culturally determined or
historically contingent, at least when those claims are invoked to justify
violations. But should the claim be taken more seriously when it
involves an entire system of government? As we have noted, the
absence of democracy or its interruption "victimizes" not simply
individuals but groups and entire societies. Should international law then
take seriously the social science evidence that has identified a series of
economic and social indicators for when democracy is likely to take root?
" Where does democracy fit into the list of attributes the international
community now demands of states? How does it rank, for example,
against social stability? The maintenance of existing boundaries?
27. Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democragy and its
Impicaions for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 10
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
2007]
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Accountability for criminal acts? There is now a growing literature
describing how democratic transitions may trade off against these and
other desirable state qualities.28 Early elections in post-conflict states, for
example, may exacerbate rather than lessen group tensions.2 9
What effects do violations of democratic norms have on a state's
standing in the international community? Codifying a principle of
popular sovereignty suggests that international law views only democratic
governments as the legitimate representatives of states. If this is the
case, does international law now require nonrecognition of
nondemocratic states? Put differently, do nondemocratic governments
lose their capacity to assert the legal entitlements of the states they
purport to govern? In a discussion of the 1990s US intervention in
Panama, Michael Reisman argued that because the Noriega government
was in the process of losing an election when the invasion occurred, it
had no standing to object to the intervention, which quickly resulted in
the acknowledged winner of the vote, Guillermo Endara, being sworn in
as President. This was because "[i]nternational law still protects
sovereignty, but-not surprisingly-it is the people's sovereignty rather
than the sovereign's sovereignty." 30  Following on this view, several
regional organizations, notably the African Union, the Organization of
American States, MERCOSUR and the Commonwealth, now deny
recognition to member state governments that attain power by extra-
constitutional means.31 This is a break with the traditional view that any
28. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Alrodties: An Inquiy in International
Law, 87 GEO. L.J. 707 (1999).
29. See JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND
NATIONALIST CONFLICT (2000).
30. W. Michael Reisman, Soverrignoy and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,
in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 243 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R.
Roth eds., 2000).
31. See CONSTTuTivE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION art. 30 (Organiation of African
Unity), July 11, 2000 available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/keyoau/auact.htm
("Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed
to participate in the activities of the Union."); Charter of the Organization of American States
art. 9, 1997, available at http://www.oas.org/uridico/english/charter.html ("A Member of the
Organiza tin whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force may
be sus~ited from the exercise of the right to participate in the sessions of the General
Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the Organization and the Specialized
Conferences as well as in the commissions, working groups and any other bodies established.');
Protocolo de Ushuaia Sobre Compromiso Democritico en El Mercosur, Bol.-Chile, arts. 4 & 5,
June 27, 1992, availabk at http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/Normas/Tratado/20e/ 20
protocolos/1998_ProtocoloUshuaia-compromisodemocr/oc3%Altico-es.pdf (any disruption
of democracy in a member state may lead to the suspension of that state's right to participate in
MERCOSUR organs and a suspension of its rights under the preferential trade instruments
promulgated by the organization); Commonwealth of Nations, Principle Commonwealth
Human Rights Treaties, Milbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Hararm Declaration, at 13,
[Vol 13:265
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government exercising effective control over a state was entitled to
recognition. And the European Union now inserts a clause in all its
agreements with nonmember states providing that adherence to
democratic norms is an essential element of the agreement. Any
disruption of democratic government thus constitutes a material breach
of the agreement.32 Each of these developments uses a state's failure to
adhere to a particular model of government to take actions that arguably
diminish its legal standing and relative equality. On the one hand this
may be seen as simply the latest iteration of the international
community's longstanding practice of subjecting what Gerry Simpson
has called "outlaw states" to a diminished set of legal entitlements.33 On
the other, it appears profoundly subversive of a general principle of state
equality that has been assumed to sit at the heart of the UN-era legal
order.
II. LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONALIZING THE NATIONAL
A. Cautionary Tales
What lessons can be drawn from this practice and the difficult questions it
raises? Before suggesting similarities between norms promoting democracy at
the national level and efforts to democratize international organizations, it is
crucial to recognize some fundamental differences. These caveats are central
to understanding the comparisons. Any proponent of democratizing
international institutions who claims a pedigree in the earlier practice must
take account of these disjunctions.
First, national democracy promotion has been directed overwhelmingly
toward developing countries of the global south. This is not a controversial
political fact: most states in the developed world were already democratic or
had experienced initial democratic transitions by the time post-Cold War
part 1.B.vi, Nov. 12, 1995, available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Shared-ASP _Files/
UploadedFiles/%7B1B46C2E0-B8F8-4484-AA9E103ADD42B 166%7D_HumanRights
Principles.pdf ("[Inn the event of an unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically elected
government," Commonwealth member states should take several steps, including: pending
restoration of democracy, exclusion of the government concerned from participation at
ministerial-level meetings of the Commonwealth, including [Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meetings].").
32. Commission Communication on the Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Prnciples and Human
Rights in Agreements between the Communiy and Third Countries, at 6-7, COM (1995) 216 (May 23,
1995). Democratic principles are defined by reference to the Conference on Security and Co-
Operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1293, 1293-96 (1975) and the Charter
of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 193, 193-95 (1991). See FRANK
HOFFMEISTER, MENSCHENRECHTS- UND DEMOKRATIEKLAUSELN IN DEN VERTRAGLICHEN
AUBENBEZIEHUNGEN DER EuRoPAIscHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 605-11 (1998); Barbara Brandmer &
Allan Rosas, Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Communiy: An Anaysis of
Doctrine and Practice, 9 EUR.J. INT'L L. 468, 473-77 (1998).
33. GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2004).
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democratization initiatives began. The democratic transitions yet to happen
and with which the international community would become preoccupied in
the 1990s lay overwhelmingly outside the developed world. Of the official
requests for electoral assistance received by the United Nations between 1989
and 2005, for example, 46% came from Africa, 19% from Latin America and
the Caribbean, 18% from Asia and 13% from Eastern Europe. Only 2% came
from Western Europe and elsewhere. 4 From the democracy promoters' point
of view-those wealthy, mostly western states who were relatively secure in
their democratic politics-this was an exceptionally useful dynamic. Not only
would democratic norms never be applied to their own political systems, but
the wide range of economic, political and military leverage points they hold
over the developing world meant that resistance to the norm could be
countered with a variety of effective countermeasures. Implementation is, of
course, another question. But there is no doubt that coercive measures were
easily available when democratization initiatives were resisted. In some cases,
such as Bosnia and Kosovo, this included the use of military force.
Such leverage is not available for efforts to democratize international
organizations. If the focus is to be on the most effective international
organizations such as the WTO or the UN, these are dominated by developed
states. Decades of failed efforts by the developed world to push its agenda
forward in these organizations demonstrate what may happen when power
rests not with the proponents of a new democratization norm but its intended
targets.35 If the focus is instead on new international organizations, such as a
peoples' assembly, resistance by developed countries would mean proceeding
largely without their participation and funding. The experience of regional
organizations in the developed world, comprised of roughly similar
memberships, is not encouraging. The unfortunate reality is that strong
international organizations have usually been built on the support of politically
stable and financially prosperous member states. Where state membership is
largely impoverished or politically unstable or both-as in the case of the
African Union and the Arab League-the organizations exert only marginal
influence on international politics. Developed countries may, of course,
become convinced of the benefit or indeed necessity of 10 democratization
and come to support either of these variants. But such a development would
be a significant departure from prior practice and thus cannot be predicted
with any confidence.
34. See Electoral Assistance Division of the United Nations, supra note 13.
35. Examples include the New International Economic Order, using economic and
political coercion as grounds for invalidating treaties and economic sanctions as a form of
prohibited aggression. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Tran-formation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1, 42-43 (2005) (New International Economic Order); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW
AND PRACTICE 256-57 (2000) (treaty coercion); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 125-126 (June 27) (economic sanctions),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inus/inus_ijudgment/inusijudgment_
19860627.pdf (last visited March 27, 2007).
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Second, the normative commitment to democracy that underlies most of
the efforts at state-level reform is simply not present for international
organizations. As we have noted, both global and regional human rights
treaties protect a right to political participation, and by the turn of the 21st
Century international tribunals and other treaty bodies had built on these
provisions to fashion an impressive body of jurisprudence. There is no
comparable normative support for the claim that international organizations
ought to be democratized. To be sure, some argue that decisions of
international organizations are democratically deficient because they originate
at least two levels above any actual consent by affected individual citizens. 36
But this is far removed from an argument for a legal entitlement to individual
participation in those decisions. The human rights movement has largely
remained moored to its origins as a set of constraints on the abuse of state
power.37 This is no less true of the participatory rights articulated in human
rights treaties, which share this state-centrism, and do not even purport to
require popular checks on other entities whose policies affect national
populations. Transnational corporations, organized religions and economically
dominant foreign states all make decisions with profound consequences for
national publics, yet international law creates no entitlement for citizens to
participate in or influence those decisions. The same is true for international
organizations.
Third, the nature of the "community" to be democratized is much less clear
than in the case of national politics. While a variety of international actors
emerged in the late 20t Century, and Westphalian absolutism, if it ever existed,
is now much diminished, we have little sense of who "counts" when we speak
of the "international community." Is the reference primarily to the organized
entities that appear in the organized, formal settings in which policies are
debated and made? This usage would probably include states and
nongovernmental organizations, but exclude individuals. Or is the concept
one more grounded in a natural law-"some form of moral collectivity of
humankind which exists as an ethical referent even if not organized in any
way" 38 in which individuals are certainly included. Absent any clear
definition of the relevant community, we have little sense of who is entitled to
claim a right of participation in the decisions of international institutions.
Human rights have certainly transformed individuals from objects to subjects
and one could make a case that they are now participants in global politics.
But what of the other oft-mentioned players we have just noted-NGOs,
corporations, religions, ethnicities, etc.? If they are members of the
community, surely they are no less entitled to rights of participation. Even
those who might argue for their inclusion would not assert that these new
36. See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateraksm and Constitutionah'sm, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971
(2004).
37. Even human rights norms applicable to conduct in the private sphere do not
purport to constrain private acts directly, but simply require states to take appropriate regulatory
steps to do so. See ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 134-39 (1993).
38. Barry Buzan & Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, 'International Community'After Iraq, 81 INT'L
AFF. 31, 32 (2005).
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members have the same legal entitlements as states. Do we then envision a
multi-tiered set of participatory rights that sort the entitlements of various
actors through mechanisms such as weighted voting, gradations of
membership ("observers," for example, who may speak but not vote) or
outright exclusion from certain 10 decisions? These arrangements could
certainly be defended as creating parity between an actor's general legal
entitlements in the international community and its rights of participation in
international organizations. But would they satisfy calls for "accountability"?
If not, on what basis could one argue that rights of participation for a member
of the international community ought to exceed-in some cases, substantially
exceed-its rights in virtually every other legal context?
These questions point out a fundamental problem in comparing public
participation in the two settings. The constituent public of a state government
is the people, and democratic theory provides principles of legitimacy, now
arguably embedded in international law, that link policy-making to popular
consent. The constituent public of an international organization, on the other
hand, is its member states. The law of international institutions, both generally
and the specific constitutional law of each individual organization, provides a
series of mechanisms by which member states may hold the organization
accountable. To argue that international organizations ought to be
"accountable," therefore, begs the question, "accountable to whom?" As
Grant and Keohane point out, arguments of democratic theory for holding
international organizations accountable unhelpfully mixes these two sets of
accountability norms.39 In order to bridge this gap, one would need to identify
a coherent "global public" that would fill the legitimating role envisioned by
national democratic politics. But,
[t]oday, there is no large and representative global public, even in the relatively
weak sense of a global "imagined community"--a transnational community of
people who share a sense of common destiny and are in the habit of
communicating with one another about issues of public policy. Particular global
publics are indeed emerging-for instance, in issue-areas such as human rights
and environmental protection-but they surely are not representative of the
world's people, and they are by no means coterminous with the sets of people
affected by the policies of states, multinational firms, or multilateral
organizations. 40
Grant and Keohane conclude that until a coherent global public emerges -
either empirically as an actual cohesive force or juridically as recognized by
global institutions-"[t]here is no simple analogy that can be made between
domestic democratic politics and global politics." 41
39. Ruth W. Grant & Robert 0. Keohane, Aceountabih'y and Abuses of Power in World
Poklics, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 29,29 (2005).
40. Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 34.
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B. Useful Lessons
With these caveats in mind, what lessons does our experience with national
democracy promotion hold for the democratization of international
institutions? Given the vast differences between the two, few easy parallels
exist. And given that opening international organizations to popular
participation is not, to say the least, likely to happen in the near future, perhaps
the most useful lessons would be for a research agenda. Proponents of
international democratization may at least learn from the questions posed by
the earlier generation which, like the current project, was faced with an entity
(the state) whose popular legitimacy had never been addressed by international
law. The following lessons, in other words, raise issues rather than resolve
them.
First, the legitimacy of individual participation in international organizations
must be established before institutional or logistical questions are addressed.
Prior practice illustrates this rather obvious point. International organizations
had no constitutional mandate to address national democratization while
debate continued on whether international law even addressed the subject.
Only the end of the Cold War, the success of democratic reform movements
across the globe, and the lack of any coherent alternative theory of political
legitimacy made collective action possible. At the United Nations in the early
1990s, democratization moved from an issue essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of states (and as such immune from scrutiny under Article 2(7) of
the Charter) to a central concern of the organization.42 Reports by election
monitoring organizations now routinely begin with discussions of international
democratic norms that have become all but boiler-plate. The legitimacy of the
enterprise is not even debated; discussion revolves around how these accepted
legal principles have fared on the facts of each case.43
This is no less true in light of the recent skepticism about democracy
promotion in the wake of the Iraq debacle. Criticism has been grounded not
in a widespread rejection of democratization norms but in the view that the
intervention in fact exceeded accepted norms.44 Multilateral democracy
promotion has always been predicated on consent by the target state or, at the
very least, a mandate from the UN Security Council that reforms could
proceed absent consent. Fallout from the Iraq invasion can thus be
understood, first and foremost, as a rejection of the idea of unilateral pro-
democratic intervention. To be sure, some commentators go farther,
questioning whether failure in Iraq is symptomatic of inherent limitations in
the external implantation of democratic institutions, particularly in regions
with no democratic tradition.45 But this is arguably an overreaction to extreme
42. See Christopher Joyner, The United Nations and Democray, 5 GLOBAL Gov. 333, 340
(1999).
43. See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Poliical Participation in International Law, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 27, at 48, 83-84.
44. See general# Agora: Future Implhcation of the Iraq Confict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (2003).
45. See Anatol Lieven, Wolfish Wilsonians: Existential Dilemmas of the Liberal
Internationaists, 50 ORBIs 243,243-49 (2006).
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circumstances. Such claims were notably absent in the wake of the Kosovo,
Bosnia and Cambodia missions, which brought elections and other democratic
institutions to deeply resistant societies and leaders. There seems little evidence
that the UN has lessened its institutional commitment to democracy
promotion post-Iraq, and indeed launched an important new initiative, the
United Nations Democracy Fund, nearly two years after the intervention. 46 If
this normative foundation has emerged relatively unscathed then debate will
continue to focus on logistics.
But as long as the legitimacy of democratizing international organizations
remains an open question, any practical efforts to structure popular input are
likely to be lost in a swirl of more fundamental objections. Indeed, the nature
of any legitimizing principle is itself unclear, further complicating the debate.
Is individual participation in international organizations a principle of human
rights, to be addressed by the same human rights treaties guaranteeing
participation in national politics? Or is it a question of each organization's
constitutional structure? Or is it primarily a domestic law obligation of each
state to grant citizens a voice in the international organizations whose
decisions affect their national legal systems? These "category" questions are
not mere semantics, since the different bodies of law diverge widely in their
roles, standards, and institutional structures.
Second, if individuals acquire new rights in international organizations do
they also bear certain responsibilities for the organizations' collective actions?
At a minimum these might involve ideological obligations similar to the
requirements of membership in certain international organizations: members
of the United Nations, for example, must be "peace-loving" 47 and new
members of the European Union must accept democracy and human rights as
fundamental principles.48 They might also involve financial obligations or a
willingness to support decisions by executive bodies of the organization. UN
members, for example, must accept Chapter VII decisions of the Security
Council, which might include severing diplomatic and commercial relations
with other states or acting in a certain way toward their own citizens. 49 Would
individuals incur similar obligations? The argument for obligations being a
necessary concomitant of rights is a common one that needs little elaboration.
46. See UN.org, What is The United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF)?
http://www.un.org/democracyfund/XWWhatisUNDEF.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
47. UN Charter art. 4, para. 1.
48. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union arts. 6, 49, Dec. 24, 2002,
2002 O.J. (C 325) 9, 11, 31, available at http://www.elispub.com/downloads/eu-cons
_treaty.pdf.
49. In Resolution 748 (1992), the Security Council invoked Chapter VII to order
Libya to surrender two of its citizens wanted in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland. S.C. Res. 748, paras. 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992), available
at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/01 1/07/IMG/NROOll07.pdf
?OpenElement.
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Some human rights instruments make the connection explicidy, 50 but
citizenship in every state involves a social contract that both grants benefits
and imposes obligations, most importantly that of loyalty. Every state
punishes the crime of treason and there are few good arguments that a citizen
should enjoy the protection and support of her state but retain the freedom to
undermine its security.
If pairing obligations with the benefits of political participation is not
controversial at the national level, there seems little reason it should be
controversial internationally. But to state the principle is to raise a host of
questions that demonstrate, quite starkly, the theoretical poverty of a right to
participate in international organizations. Which individuals would incur these
obligations? Those elected as representatives to an international organization,
those voting for such representatives, or all persons everywhere on the theory
they are now the constituent public of the organizations? What if those
obligations conflicted with the individuals' obligations under national law?
Would international organizations assume the superiority of their dictates as is
the case vis-a-vis member states? What if obligations to one organization
conflicted with obligations to another? Would standard rules on treaty
conflict 5' accord priority among the obligations or would a lex specialis apply?
National democratization provides little assistance other than the fact that
international law has simply not addressed citizen obligations to their states. A
roughly parallel approach would let each organization set its own policy on
obligations and provide no overarching principles. But this is unsatisfactory.
The relation between citizen and state evolved through centuries of national
practice before international law came to address the broadest principles of
electoral structure and fairness. The relation between individuals and
international organizations, by contrast, has virtually no history and would
come into existence by the legal fiat of those organizations. The national
approach of leaving obligations to an existing "default" arrangement cannot be
replicated internationally. An international law of obligations would need to
be elaborated as part and parcel of the larger accountability project, thus
presenting to its architects all of the questions raised above.
Third and finally, the scope of the entitlement to participation must be
addressed. Rights to participate in state politics are guaranteed to "citizens"
and are conceived as entitlements of opportunity and not of result. 52 How
would these limitations translate? As to the first, would participation be
limited to citizens of an organization's member states? Or would all citizens
be eligible? If the former, would all member states be allocated the same
50. See Organization of African Unity, African (Banjul) Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights art. 45, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982),
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Banjul%20
Charter.pdf (detailing individual "duties").
51. See Christopher J. Borgen, Resoving Treaty Conlors, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
573passim (2005).
52. No other right in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
limited to citizens. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 3, at art.
25 (participatory rights guaranteed to "every citizen').
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number of citizen representatives or would some sort of weighting process be
necessary, perhaps by population or state contribution? The argument for
weighting would seem particularly strong for organizations like the World
Bank where member states' voting is weighted. What about states that join
treaty bodies with reservations? Would their citizens be prevented from
advocating on the issues subject to the reservations?
As to the second characteristic, what role will individuals play within the
organizations? Few states employ systems of pure participatory democracy,
and international law's role has therefore been largely to ensure the process of
electing representatives is free and fair. If international participation is
similarly conceived along republican lines, one way to translate the national
entitlement would be for citizens to vote for their state's representatives to
international organizations. This seems unlikely, however, and, as noted earlier,
is not the sort of accountability envisioned by proponents. More likely would
be separate "citizen representatives" who work in some capacity alongside
state representatives. But as the endless debate over reform of the UN
Security Council demonstrates, finding an acceptable role for new players in
international organizations is an extraordinarily difficult task. For one, the
constitutive treaties of each organization would require amendment. At the
UN all amendments are subject to Security Council veto. Another, more
fundamental question is the role envisioned for citizen representatives. Would
they vote on pending issues or simply voice their opinions in the manner of
"observers" at the United Nations?53 If the latter, they would seem largely to
duplicate the role of the UN General Assembly, which passes advisory
resolutions that are often at odds with the interests of larger powers. This
raises a final challenge: to find a parallel to the efficiency argument for state-
level popular sovereignty. Mill and others claim that democratic governments
produce better policies because they are more transparent and must respond
seriously to criticisms leveled by opposition parties. But this claim obviously
assumes that those elected actually make policy. This would almost certainly
not be the case for citizen representatives. Can they nonetheless argue that
their mere presence within the institution will improve policy outcomes?
Could adding an additional institutional layer, even if advisory, lead to the
opposite result?
III. CONCLUSIONS
The comparison explored in this article is in one sense unfair. Popular
participation in national government is one of the most thoroughly analyzed
questions of history, philosophy, law and empirical political science. One
might view international law on the subject as simply codifying the most
widely accepted conclusions of these cognate disciplines. An entitlement to
53. See R.G. SYBESMA-KNOL, THE STATUS OF OBSERVERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS
(1981).
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participate in international organizations has no similar pedigree. International
organizations of any consequence emerged only in the second half of the 20t
h
Century, only becoming truly effective in its last decade. The United Nations,
World Trade Organization/GATT and European Union of the 1990s hardly
resemble those organizations a generation earlier. It is no coincidence that
critiques of the organizations' legitimacy and accountability only attracted a
following when the paralysis of the Cold War had receded. Given this radical
imbalance in experience between the two settings, it is hardly surprising that
the international claims find few direct parallels in the national claim. The
relation between individuals and international organizations is simply too
under-theorized and too new to offer coherent answers to the questions
national democratic theory has long explored.
Any conclusions are therefore preliminary and highly contingent. But if
they are needed, my view is that the national experience does not hold a
promising future for an international entitlement. First, although international
law has long settled on the sovereign state as the center of its legal order, in
many regions the state is still a work in progress. Many citizens hold primary
loyalties to nonstate groupings (ethnicity, religion). In many regions the state
does not meet Weber's minimal definition of sovereignty: of holding a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In many of the same areas basic
state services are not provided. International law has moved on many fronts
to help the reality of the state in these circumstances live up to its legal ideal.54
But until progress is made on this front, the prospect of international law
effectively diluting these efforts by adding another entity to the tangled mix of
identities in these settings seems unlikely and counter-productive. Strong
international organizations have traditionally been built on strong states (in the
sense of being minimally functional and perceived, for the most part, as
legitimate by their citizens). Until efforts to strengthen states bear more fruit,
efforts to substitute for state failures by opening international avenues of
participation offer little hope of progress. Indeed, success in fostering
stronger states might obviate the need for many of the coercive acts by
international organizations-aid conditionality, international territorial
administration, asymmetrical trade agreements-that prompted calls for
individual participation in the first place.
Second, the legal relationships between the many actors involved in a right
of individual participation are simply too complex to resolve by fiat.
Nationally, only two sets of actors are involved: individuals and the state.
Hundreds of years of practice and debate have been needed to reach the rather
basic principles of popular sovereignty that now describe that relationship.
But internationally, the number of actors multiplies exponentially: almost two
hundred states, citizens from each of those states and hundreds of
international organizations. As discussed above, it is hardly self-evident how
rights and duties among and between these different actors ought to be
54. See Gregory H. Fox, Strngthening the State, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35
(1999).
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structured. The answer can only come from experience that slowly builds
consensus. This will arrive, if at all, many, many years in the future.
There is, finally, a strategic question. International organizations have only
a tenuous call on state loyalty. For many states, their benefits only marginally
outweigh costs in the delegation of decision-making, greater susceptibility to
coercive pressures by other states and changes in policy dictated by the
organizations' objectives. If added to these costs there was the possibility that
a state's citizens might take positions in an organization opposed to those
taken by the state itself, the equation might well tip toward a negative
assessment. Some scholars argued that it is possible to "overlegalize"
international relations; to codify too much too quickly and make "substantive
rules or review mechanisms too constraining of sovereignty and precipitat[e] a
backlash by governments[.]" 55 This could well be the case if the fragile
legitimacy of international organizations is pressed beyond its limits.
55. Laurence R. Heifer, Overkgak#zng Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Canhbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1832, 1834
(2002).
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